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Introduction
The main question addressed in this paper deals with the leader-follower choice under (a¢ ne) supply function competition within an extended game with observable delay à la Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) . To this end, we model supply functions as in Menezes and Quiggin (2012) , where …rms choose the intercepts of a¢ ne supply functions. Doing so, Menezes and Quiggin (2012) prove the existence of a continuum of equilibria ranging from Cournot (when the slope of supply functions is nil) to Bertrand (when the slope tends to in…nity).
In a widely cited paper, Bulow et al. (1985) introduce an important criterion to classify the strategic nature of di¤erent choice variables in oligopolistic games. Borrowing a well established terminology from demand theory, they identify a binary taxonomy opposing strategic complements to strategic substitutes.
We …rst show that the (intercept of) supply function may feature both strategic substitutability or complementarity, depending on the steepness of supply functions. More precisely, we identify a unique critical threshold of the slope, below which competition takes place in strategic substitutes, whereas the opposite applies above the threshold. The switch between strategic substitutability and complementarity does not arise in the initial modelization of linear supply functions dating back to Klemperer and Meyer (1989) where the intercept is zero. In such a setting …rms compete in the space of slopes, and it turns out that slopes are strategic complements and the resulting Nash equilibrium in supply functions -which is unique in absence of uncertaintylies between Cournot and Bertrand. The …rst author pointing out the emergence of strategic complementarity among slopes is Laussel (1992), and the 1 same property is stressed again in Akgün (2004) . 1 Solving the extended game with observable delay, we prove that when supply functions are not too steep, …rms play simultaneously as soon as possible because competition takes place in strategic substitutes, while they play sequentially (and therefore the mixed strategy equilibrium is also relevant) when supply functions are su¢ ciently steep and the game is in strategic complements. In correspondence of the critical threshold of the slope, best replies are orthogonal and Stackelberg and Nash equilibria coincide.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we study the properties of a¢ ne supply functions when …rms choose intercepts in a well known model of duopoly with product di¤erentiation. The extended game with observable delay and its equilibrium analysis, including the mixed strategy equilibrium, are illustrated in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
The model
We consider the model of di¤erentiated duopoly introduced by Spence (1976) and Singh and Vives (1984) . The utility function of the representative consumer is
where q i is the quantity of the variety supplied by …rm i = 1; 2; a > 0 and parameter 2 (0; 1] measures the degree of product substitutability, i.e.,
is an inverse measure of product di¤erentiation. When = 1; the product is 1 Ciarreta and Gutierrez-Hita (2006) model linear supply functions in a supergame where the focus is on implicit collusion. Since they set intercepts to zero and …rms choose slopes, their game is one in strategic complements. Vives (2011) follows the same approach as in Klemperer and Meyer (1989) using the notion of residual demand curve under market clearing and leaving aside the issue of the strategic nature of supply functions.
2
homogeneous. 2 The direct demand functions resulting from the constrained maximisation problem are:
System (2) can be inverted to yield the direct demand system:
On the supply side, both single-product …rms operate with the linear cost
Before delving into the analysis of supply function competition, it is worth recalling two basic properties of Cournot and Bertrand competition. De…ne the best reply of …rm i in the quantity and price spaces, respectively, as q i (q j ) and p i (p j ). Their slopes are
and
as we know from Singh and Vives (1984) . On the basis of (5-6), one establishes that, for any degree of product substitutability, best replies are decreasing in the quantity space and increasing in the price space. In the jargon of Bulow et al. (1985) , this amounts to saying that quantities are strategic substitutes and prices are strategic complements when goods are substitutes in demand.
To model competition in supply functions, we focus on linear supply functions. More precisely, we adopt the formulation introduced by Menezes and Quiggin (2012). The supply function of …rm i is de…ned as S i = i c=2 + i (p i c) ; and the ex ante market clearing condition is S i = q i , where q i is de…ned as in (2) . The presence of two varieties requires imposing two market-clearing conditions. Taking the individual demand function in (2), whenever q i > 0; market clearing requires imposing:
Solving system (7) w.r.t. p i and p j ; and substituting the resulting marketclearing prices into the supply functions, we can write …rm i's supply function
and the pro…t function of …rm i therefore writes as
As in Menezes and Quiggin (2012), we assume that competition in supply function takes place in the space of intercepts ( 1 ; 2 ) ; with 1 = 2 = 2 [0; 1). The advantage of using the approach of Menezes and Quiggin (2012) lies in the fact that it generates a continuum of equilibria ranging from Cournot (when = 0) to Bertrand, which is reached in the limit as tends to in…nity.
Taking the …rst order condition (FOC) for the maximisation of (9) w.r.t.
i and solving, one obtains the best reply function of …rm i:
To understand the strategic nature of competition in supply functions, it su¢ ces to take the partial derivative of i ( j ) w.r.t. j :
Inspecting (11), which is continuous and twice di¤erentiable in , for all 2 [0; 1), one proves the following:
The Lemma shows that the individual …rm's best reply derived under supply function competition delivers strategic substitutability (complementarity) as under Cournot (Bertrand) behaviour in the inf (sup) of the support of parameter . Additionally, strategic substitutability holds for all 2 0; 1= p 1 2 while strategic complementarity emerges for all 2 1= p 1 2 ; 1 . In correspondence of = 1= p 1 2 best replies are orthogonal in the space ( 1 ; 2 ). The intuition is fairly clear: as product di¤erentiation tends to vanish (i.e., approaches one), we enter a domain in which …rms'best replies are upward sloping, and therefore they operate under strategic complementarity mimicking price competition which is reached in the limit as goes to in…nity.
The symmetric Nash equilibrium is attained at
delivering pro…ts
The analysis of simultaneous play, which Menezes and Quiggin (2012) carry out under product homogeneity, shows that if supply functions are ‡at, the supply function Nash equilibrium collapses onto the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, while if supply functions are in…nitely steep, the equilibrium degenerates into the Bertrand-Nash one. The same applies here under product di¤erentiation. This can be veri…ed on the basis of (13):
which is the individual Cournot-Nash pro…t, and
which is the individual Bertrand-Nash pro…t as in Singh and Vives (1984) .
This property allows Menezes and Quiggin (2012) to claim that supply function competition yields a continuum of equilibria generated by , with the classical Bertrand and Cournot equilibria as limit cases. What we are about to prove the existence of multiple equilibria relying on Lemma 1, as the multiplicity is the consequence of the link between the slope of the supply function and that of the best reply in the space. 
The set of times at which …rms can choose to move is T = ft 1 ; t 2 g, i.e., early or late. The set of strategies for player i is
. It is worth stressing that the notion of time underpinning the extended game with observable delay is purely logical and involves no discounting.
The resulting two-stage game is fully noncooperative, and the outcome of the …rst stage (i.e., the choice of timing) is observable to all …rms alike before the second stage takes place. If in the market subgame both …rms choose to move at the same time (t i = t j ), they obtain the pro…ts associated with the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, otherwise they get the pro…ts associated with the Stackelberg equilibrium, with i moving …rst and j moving second, or vice versa.
To characterise the Stackelberg equilibrium in supply functions, we denote the leader and the follower by L and F , respectively. Firm L maximises pro…ts under the constraint posed by the follower's best reply function (10).
The resulting equilibrium strategy for the leader is
where
8 which is positive for all 2 0; 1= p 1 2 ; while the opposite applies in the remainder of the admissible range of . That is, L > F when …rms'choices are strategic substitutes, whereas L < F under strategic complementarity.
In the special case in which = 1= p 1 2 ; since best replies are orthogonal, Nash and Stackelberg equilibria coincide, in such a way that the tangency point between …rm i's highest isopro…t curve and …rm j's best reply function occurs in correspondence of the intersection of best replies themselves (see Figure 1 ). The pro…ts generated by the Stackelberg equilibrium values of 's are the 9 following:
We are now in a position to describe the pre-play stage for the choice of timing. The resulting reduced form describing the …rst stage is in Matrix 1.
Using expressions (13) and (19-20), we can rank the pro…ts appearing in Matrix 1: consequently the mixed strategy equilibrium also becomes relevant.
The above Proposition has an obvious implication:
; the issue of choosing roles is immaterial.
This happens because reaction functions are orthogonal and therefore F = N = L and the Nash and Stackelberg outcomes coincide.
To compute the equilibrium in mixed strategies at the pre-play stage, de…ne by p i the probability that player i attaches to t 1 ; so that the probability attached to t 2 is 1 p i . Player i must set p i so as to make player j indi¤erent between the two pure strategies. That is, payo¤s
must coincide. This happens at
11 with
As a result, b p i 2 (0; 1) for all 2 1= 
and the map of best replies is as in Figure 3 . That is, as soon as is low enough as to make best replies orthogonal or downward sloping, …rms select to play as early as possible and the Nash equilibrium results. Note that, in the limit, as product di¤erentiation vanishes, lim !1 1= p 1 2 = 1 and therefore …rms are forced to select (t 1 ; t 1 ) ; playing the dominant strategy equilibrium under strategic substitutability.
Concluding remarks
We have illustrated the endogenous timing of moves in a di¤erentiated duopoly where …rms compete in a¢ ne supply functions by choosing their intercepts 14 as in Menezes and Quiggin (2012) . To do so, we have relied upon the concept of extended game with observable delay (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990 ). Since best replies are downward (upward) sloping if the common slope of supply functions is su¢ ciently low (high), simultaneous (sequential) play is part of the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy pro…le when best replies are negatively (positively) sloped. Hence, while Menezes and Quiggin (2012) use a¢ ne supply functions to reproduce Cournot and Bertrand Nash equilibria as limit cases, here we have shown that a¢ ne supply functions can also be used to reconstruct the same endogenous timing arising under quantity and price competition, as in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) .
